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Section 301 and U.S. Trade Law: The Limited
Impact of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act on American
Obligations Under GATT
Josh Scheint
INTRODUCTION
A. Overview
In 1988, President Reagan signed the Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act (OTCA), a broad set of trade laws overlying a sizable preex-
isting legal framework which included Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974.1 The OTCA changed some U.S. trade law provisions while leaving
other areas undisturbed. Foreign trading partners reacted sharply to the
passage and implementation of the OTCA, arguing that it conflicted with
American obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).2 Although no trading partner hag formally challenged the
OTCA under GATT thus far, the potential for conflict exists.
This Comment will briefly summarize GATT and Section 301 before
turning to the principal question of whether the unilateral retaliatory pro-
visions the OTCA adds to Section 301 conflict with American obligations
under the GATT accord. The analysis will cover potential GATT chal-
lenges to Section 301, U.S. legal options, and strategic ramifications.
f B.A. 1987, The University of West Virginia; J.D. Candidate 1992, The University of
Washington.
1. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-418, 102 Stat
1107, amending Trade Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat 1978, amended by Pub L
No 98-573, § 304, 98 Stat 2948, codified as amended at 19 USC § 2411 (1988). Commentators
often refer to this area of law as "Section 301," although the section operates in tandem with
related provisions on trade law. For example, Section 302 contains a mechanism allowing
private parties to file grievances with the USTR for consideration under Section 301. Section 304
contains a statutory definition of "unreasonable," a term examined below.
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct 30, 1947, 61 Stat pts 5-6, TIAS No 1700
("GAT").
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B. Background on GATT
1. GATT Origin, History, and Importance
The United States and 21 other nations signed the GATT accords in
1946 as a temporary measure to stabilize global trade in the aftermath of
World War II. No one expected GATT to become a permanent agree-
ment, much less an organization.4 Instead, GATT's creators established
a parental body, the International Trade Organization (ITO), to assume a
broad range of duties that included the enforcement of GATT until a
permanent legal structure could be established.5 GATT soon became per-
manent by default, however, when the ITO collapsed for lack of U.S. Sen-
ate ratification.6 Through necessity, GATT has since become an
unofficial international organization7 employing a staff of roughly 200
professionals.8 GATT has also become the primary multilateral agree-
ment on trade in goods in the Western world.9
2. General GATT Principles
The GATT accords1 ° have one main goal: promoting world trade.
GATT's central tenet for promoting trade is a "most-favored-nation"
(MFN) clause in Article I which imposes one fundamental requirement
for customs duties and charges on imports and exports:
any advantage, favour, privilege, or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for
any country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally
to the like product originating in or destined for the territories
of all other contracting parties. 1
3. John H. Jackson, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials,
and Text 398 (West, 1977).
4. Id at 396.
5. Id at 397.
6. Note, Free Trade Area Agreements and U.S. Trade Policy, 18 NYU J Intl L & Pol 1281,
1284 (1986) (citing authority).
7. See John H. Jackson & William J. Davey, Legal Problems of International Economic
Relations: Cases, Materials and Text 313 (1986) ("Jackson & Davey"). GATT essentially
became an "international organization" in 1960, although it was never officially designated as
such.
8. C. Michael Aho, More Bilateral Trade Agreements Would Be a Blunder: What the New
President Should Do, 22 Cornell Intl L J 25, 35 (1989).
9. Note, 18 NYU J Intl L & Pol at 1284 (cited in note 6).
10. See Jackson & Davey at 296 (cited in note 7). GAT is not one agreement but is
instead a patchwork of many separate agreements.
11. GATT, Art I (cited in note 2).
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GATT contains other articles specifying additional requirements and
goals for member nations, some of which will be discussed below.
3. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Under GAIT
Instead of employing one mechanism for settling disputes, GATT
has developed more than 30 separate procedures which depend upon the
type of trade affected.12 These procedures involve varying degrees of for-
mality.13 Some are complex while others stipulate little more than that
the parties involved should meet and attempt to settle their differences.
Some involve creating GATT panels that make "interpretations" of
GATT articles or issue reports. 4 GATT rules do not clearly determine
the extent to which a GATT panel interpretation binds a nation, and the
issue has never been forced.15
When GATT does take action, the primary sanction available is the
retaliatory suspension of trade obligations toward an offending party.
This retaliation almost always operates on an unofficial basis, however.
GATT has approved "formal retaliation" only once16 and chose a tariff-
related penalty. 17
C. Summary of U.S. Trade Law and Section 301
1. Origin, History, and Importance of Section 301
The U.S. government has long regulated foreign trade. The first sub-
stantive bill to pass Congress in 1789 involved foreign trade; 8 it erected
tariff barriers as high as 50% on some items to preserve American inde-
pendence. 9 Throughout most of American history, Congress largely
controlled trade policy,2° but Franklin Roosevelt caused a significant shift
12. Jackson & Davey at 332-33 (cited in note 7).
13. Id at 335.
14. Id at 313.
15. Id.
16. Id at 334.
17. The Netherlands had complained about U.S. cheese import restrictions, and GATT
allowed the Netherlands to withdraw trade concessions of equivalent value. Robert E. Hudec,
Retaliation Against "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The New Section 301 and GA7T
Nullification and Impairment, 59 Minn L Rev 461, 505-07 (1975). GAIT occasionally allows
withdrawal or suspension of concessions for reasons unrelated to retaliation, and GATT
members sometimes resort to these measures as a means of "informal" retaliation. See notes 109-
119 and accompanying text discussing Article XIX of GATT and "emergency" protection for
troubled industries.
18. David E. Birenbaum, The Omnibus Trade Act of 1988: Trade Law Dialectics, 10 U Pa
J Intl Bus L 653, 655 (1988).
19. Senator Ernest F. Hollings, No More Uncle Sucker, NY Times A15 (March 26, 1991).
20. Birenbaum, 10 U Pa J Intl Bus L at 655 (cited in note 18).
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toward stronger presidential authority during the Great Depression.21
Roosevelt secured presidential power to negotiate tariff-cutting agree-
ments and extend MFN status to trading partners without consulting
Congress. 22 For a time, international trade came largely under presiden-
tial control.2 3
Congress began to reassert power in the 1960s, however, when legis-
lators started to complain that presidents were doing little to stop foreign
trading partners from harming American interests. In 1962, Congress
passed Section 252(c) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, a provision
which allowed the president to suspend trade benefits accorded to any
nation whose import restrictions "directly or indirectly substantially bur-
den U.S. commerce."'2 4 Congress then turned to GATT but questioned
GATT's ability to stay neutral25 and ensure prompt action on U.S. com-
plaints involving proliferating bilateral and free trade agreements.2 6 As a
result, Congress reacted to these concerns by creating Section 301 as part
of the Trade Act of 1974.27
Section 301 has consistently generated more complaints among for-
eign trading partners than any other area of U.S. trade law. It established
formal mechanisms to coordinate the governmental and private sectors
toward the common goal of promoting U.S. exports. Although U.S. citi-
21. Id at 655. See also Cooper, Trade Policy and Foreign Policy: U.S. Trade Policies in a
Changing World Economy (1987) for discussion on the Hawley-Smoot (or Smoot-Hawley) Tariff
Act of 1930:
The most disastrous single mistake any American president has made in international
relations was Herbert Hoover's signing of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act into law in
June 1930. The sharp increase in American tariffs, the apparent indifference of the U.S.
authorities to the implications of their actions for foreigners, and the foreign retaliation
that quickly followed, as threatened, helped convert what would have been otherwise a
normal economic downturn into a major world depression. The sharp decline in
foreign trade and economic activity in turn undermined the position of the moderates
with respect to nationalists in Japanese politics and paved the way for the electoral
victory of the Nazis in Germany in 1932. Japan promptly invaded China in 1931, and
the basis for the Second World War was laid.
22. Birenbaum, 10 U Pa J Intl Bus L at 655 (cited in note 18).
23. See id at 654-57.
24. See Comment, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Its Utility Against Alleged Unfair
Trade Practices by the Japanese Government, 81 Nw U L Rev 492, 495 (1987).
25. Hudec, 59 Minn L Rev at 513-14 (cited in note 17). From 1969 to 1973, although the
U.S. successfully took several complaints to GATT, many legislators believed that American
success in GATT owed more to American forcefulness than to GATT's dispute-solving
machinery. Many legislators today suspect that some GATT members are quietly satisfied with
broad GATT language that encourages the avoidance of responsibility. See also Jackson &
Davey at 298 (cited in note 7): "It has been said that GATT is 'riddled with exceptions,' and
that 'a lawyer could drive a four-horse team through any obligation that anybody had.'"
26. Hudec, 59 Minn L Rev at 533 (cited in note 17) (discussing legislative debate).
27. Trade Act of 1974, 19 USC § 2411 (1974).
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zens cannot compel the removal of trade barriers in foreign markets,
2 8
Section 301 requires the U.S. government to attempt to open foreign mar-
kets where appropriate. 29 "Section 301 allows U.S. parties to attack, in
the United States, the acts, policies, or practices of foreign governments or
their instrumentalities that adversely affect U.S. commerce including, but
not limited to, barriers to U.S. export commerce."30 As discussed below,
when the U.S. government chooses to apply a remedy, Section 301 offers a
number of options.31
The first version of Section 301 contained provocative language that
Congress watered down in later versions.32 However, Section 301 has
remained ambiguous as to whether or to what extent it authorizes the
U.S. to violate GATT.3 3 Congress contemplated but ultimately rejected a
requirement that the president consider U.S. international obligations
before taking Section 301 actions against foreign trading partners.3 4
However, Section 301 as enacted in 1974 contained no explicit language
sanctioning conflict with the principles of GATT. 5
Whether Congress and the president will maintain the GATT-consis-
tency of Section 301 is an open question. Presidential restraint in the use
of Section 301 has been the most significant factor thus far in preventing
significant clashes between GATT and Section 301.36 The actual use of
Section 301 as a tool has been less significant than its potential applica-
tion. As Holmer & Bello explain:
Unilateral action-retaliation-was never conceived as the
objective of Section 301; rather, the credible threat of retaliation
was intended to serve as a stick that, in combination with the
28. Bait S. Fisher & Ralph G. Steinhardt III, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974:
Protection for U.S. Exporters of Goods, Services, and Capital 14 L & Policy Intl Bus 569, 578-79
(1982).
29. Id at 579.
30. Id at 573, citing 19 USC § 2411 (Supp 1980).
31. See notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
32. For example, both houses of Congress considered granting authority to the president to
violate several GATT articles when faced with "unreasonable" foreign import restrictions.
"Many GATT articles, such as Article I (MFN principle), Article III (taxes after importing),
Article XII (balance of payments safeguards), or Article XXIV (regional trade associations) are
either inappropriate in today's economic world or are being observed more often in the
breach .. " Hudec, 59 Minn L Rev at 517 (cited in note 17) (quoting S Rep No 93-1298, 93d
Cong, 2d Sess 162 (1974)).
33. Id at 516-17.
34. Id at 516.
35. Id at 516.
36. Id at 517.
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carrot of an open U.S. trade market, could pry open foreign
markets and thus further liberalize trade.37
2. Substantive Requirements of a Section 301 Petition
Although either the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) or private
parties may initiate Section 301 actions, most actions stem from petitions
made by private parties.38 Petitioning parties must prove (1) proper sub-
ject matter jurisdiction for the USTR; (2) proper standing as interested
parties; (3) injury resulting from the foreign trade practice; and (4) a sub-
stantive violation of Section 301. 31 Jurisdiction, standing, and injury are
generally easy hurdles;' the real test in most cases is whether a party can
show a substantive violation of Section 301.
Petitioners can establish a substantive violation of Section 301 by
showing foreign government conduct which violates international agree-
ments or is discriminatory, unjustifiable, or unreasonable.41 Section 301
complaints against violations of international agreements, by definition,
cannot be inconsistent with GATT. Because Section 301 and GATT
employ similar definitions of "discrimination," U.S. allegations of dis-
crimination under Section 301 are unlikely to conflict with GATT.42 For
the same reason, Section 301 complaints against practices deemed "unjus-
37. Alan F. Holmer & Judith Hipler Bello, The 1988 Trade Bill: Savior or Scourge of the
International Trading System? 23 Intl Law 523, 527 (1989).
38. Comment, 81 Nw U L Rev at 501 (cited in note 21). See also Holmer & Bello, 23 Intl
Law at 529-30 (cited in note 37). Self-initiation of investigations was unprecedented until
President Reagan and the USTR began the practice in 1985. See also Marco C.E.J. Bronckers,
Selective Safeguard Measares in Multilateral Trade Relations: Issues of Protectionism in GATT,
European Community, and United States Law 185 (1985) ("Selective Safeguard Measures"). The
rationale for allowing the USTR to initiate investigations was that U.S. businesses needed to be
able to complain about foreign government practices without incurring the wrath of those
governments and that the USTR could thus act as a buffer. Bronckers suggests, however, that
foreign governments are generally aware of the sources of most complaints in any case.
39. Comment, 81 Nw U L Rev at 500 (cited in note 24).
40. Id at 500-502. Section 301 has subject matter jurisdiction over a wide range of
restrictive foreign governmental practices concerning goods and services. For example, Section
301 petition targets have included rice, silk, leather, cigars, tobacco products, steel,
semiconductors, and restrictions on foreign attorneys. Likewise, the requirement of proper
standing presents few obstacles for most parties. The required showing of injury also contains a
broad stipulation that a cause of action exists if a foreign practice burdens U.S. commerce. As of
1987, no Section 301 complaint had ever been dismissed for insufficient showing of injury. Id at
502. See also Fisher & Steinhardt, 14 L & Policy Intl Bus at 630-31 (cited in note 28) (comparing
the "injury" test of Section 301 with other U.S. trade statutes and concluding that the test under
Section 301 is more easily satisfied).
41. 19 USC § 2411(a) (Supp 1986).
42. Nevertheless, conflict with GATT could arise. See Fisher & Steinhardt, 14 L & Policy
Intl Bus at 600 (cited in note 28) (commenting on the uncertain definition of discrimination
under U.S. trade law: "[Rlestrictions which uniquely discriminate against U.S. exports are
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tifiable" are also unlikely to conflict with GATT.4 3 Ultimately, Section
301 complaints against allegedly "unreasonable" practices are the most
likely source of conflict with GATT, a matter discussed below.
3. Remedies under Section 301
The president has broad powers and options under Section 301. The
president can unilaterally suspend United States trade concessions or
impose duties or other restrictions on the products or services of offending
nations.' The president can also employ "any diplomatic, political, or
economic leverage" available. 5 The president can act on a nondiscrimi-
natory, industry-specific basis or may target specific countries.46 Gener-
ally, however, U.S. presidents have refrained from taking drastic action:
In operation... Section 301 is likely to be more disappointing
to petitioners than internationalists. Frequently, the retaliation
chosen by the president will be nothing more than multilateral
consultations under the auspices of the most relevant trade
organizations. 47
Private parties with trade grievances will often ignore Section 301
and resort to other U.S. statutes that supply remedies for specific trade
problems. A U.S. petitioner with a patent or trademark grievance, for
example, might employ a specific provision for that area.48 Some U.S.
trade statutes, such as those relating to intellectual property, anti-dump-
ing or countervailing duties,49 partly overlap with Section 301.50 Typi-
actionable under Section 301. Restrictions which discriminate equally are somewhat more
problematic").
43. The Senate Finance Committee Report accompanying the Trade Agreements Act of
1979 defined "unjustifiable" to mean any restriction "inconsistent" with international
agreements. Id at 597 (citing S Rep No 249, 96th Cong, 1st Sess 4 (1979), reprinted in (1979)
USCCAN 390). Hudec, 59 Mim L Rev at 518 (cited in note 17), states more categorically that
"unjustifiable" is defined in GATT and cannot create a legal conflict with Section 301.
44. Fisher & Steinhardt, 14 L & Policy Intl Bus at 606 (cited in note 28).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id at 690.
48. See id at 629-30 (discussing Section 337 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1930, 19 USC
§ 1337(a) (1976), which broadly outlaws "unfair trade practices" and generally targets
intellectual property issues. See also Comment, 81 Nw U L Rev at 507-08 (cited in note 24).
49. Countervailing duty laws tax imports deemed to have been improperly subsidized by
foreign governments.
50. Private parties may prefer Section 301 for other reasons. See, for example, Selective
Safeguard Measures at 203 (cited in note 38): "Section 301 appears to have a lower admissibility
threshold, compared to the countervailing duty, anti-dumping, and escape clause remedies."
Additionally, a Section 301 claimant need not show industry-wide injury.
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cally, U.S. statutory remedies mirror those available under international
accords.5'
4. Legislative History of the 1988 OTCA
The Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA),52 con-
ceived in 1985, went through extensive hearings and numerous House and
Senate versions before passage in 1988."3 Holmer & Bello observe that
"the conference appointed to produce a trade bill may have been the larg-
est, most complicated legislative effort ever undertaken., 54  Congress
assigned nearly 200 members of the Senate and House to seventeen sepa-
rate subconferences." The compromise bill that emerged in 1988, more
than 1000 pages in length, was heralded as "unprecedented in scope and
scale."56
Congress aimed the OTCA largely at adjustment rather than out-
right protectionism. 7 For example, the OTCA allocated nearly $1 billion
to help dislocated workers.5" Congress ultimately resisted the temptation
to enact a number of aggressive provisions. Congress also refrained from
allowing easy access to Section 201, a provision discussed below which
allows emergency trade barriers for seriously troubled U.S. industries.
Congress further refrained from enacting a particularly powerful anti-
dumping provision.5 9
51. See, for example, Comment, 81 Nw U L Rev at 512 (cited in note 24), citing Office of
Intl Sector, Dept of Commerce, An Examination of the Adequacy of U.S. Trade Laws as They
Affect the Competitiveness of High Technology Industries 37 18 (1983), stating that U.S.
countervailing duties are in compliance with the International Subsidies Code. Additionally,
Section 201 under 19 USC § 2251 offers an emergency escape option similar to Article XIX of
GATT which will be discussed below.
52. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-418, 102 Stat 1107
(1988) (cited in note 1).
53. Birenbaum, 10 U Pa J Intl Bus L at 653 (cited in note 18).
54. Alan F. Holmer & Judith Hipler Bello, The Promise & Peril of Unilateralism in Trade
Law and Policy, 510 Prac L Inst 187, 187-95 (1989). USTRs have been trying for some time to
pursue labor rights issues through GATT, but with the OTCA, Carla Hills must adeptly
negotiate an especially delicate balance between enforcement of OTCA and response to
international criticism.
55. Birenbaum, 10 U Pa J Intl Bus L at 654 (cited in note 18).
56. Aho, 22 Cornell Intl L J at 26 (cited in note 8).
57. Birenbaum, 10 U Pa J Intl Bus L at 659 (cited in note 18).
58. Id.
59. Id at 660-61. Birenbaum discusses the movement of the OTCA toward moderation in
scope and detail. In 1985 and 1986, the trade bill looked certain to be aggressive, and bills passed
by Congress were denounced by President Reagan as "Sons of Smoot-Hawley" or "Rambo-
esque." Several factors helped to water down the final version, however: the fall of the dollar,
more aggressive use of Section 301 by the executive branch, and a number of influential figures
renewing a call for multilateral cooperation through GATT. Finally, the 1987 stock market
crash helped to prevent the OTCA from becoming a more protectionist bill. "It caused Congress
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The OTCA broadly overhauls a range of U.S. trade provisions
including Sections 301 and 201, revising some areas and leaving others
unchanged. The OTCA continues the singular focus of Section 301 on
the opening of markets for U.S. exports.' Mostly, the OTCA expresses
legislative frustration over trade problems while carefully refraining from
upsetting established balances. For example, the USTR receives a sym-
bolic transfer of power, but ultimate authority remains with the presi-
dent.61 The OTCA prods the president to act more decisively on trade
problems under Section 301 but leaves the president with final discre-
tion.6 2 Although the OTCA may appear at first glance sometimes to
require mandatory retaliation under Section 301, the president retains the
power to halt the process.6 3
I. GATT CHALLENGES TO SECTION 301
Foreign trading partners can attempt to challenge the GATT-legality
of Section 301 on two grounds, both of which predate the OTCA.64 First,
a trading partner can allege that Section 301 violates the multilateral prin-
ciples of the GATT accords. Second, a trading partner can charge that
Section 301 is discriminatory. Here, a trading partner can allege that Sec-
tion 301 discriminates against "open" countries, i.e., countries that allow
the gathering of information essential for a Section 301 investigation and
complaint. Alternatively, a trading partner can allege that political or
to stop and think... No one wanted to play the role of Messrs. Smoot and Hawley." Id at 660-
61.
60. See Comment, 81 Nw U L Rev at 493 (cited in note 24): "Although Section 301 joins a
number of other United States trade statutes in granting authority to protect domestic industries
from foreign competition, it is unique in its ability to promote exports." See also Birenbaum, 10
U Pa J Intl Bus L at 657 (cited in note 18): "By definition, Section 301, which aims at opening
markets to U.S. exports, does not lend itself to the legal process which has come to characterize
remedies for unfair import competition."
61. Holmer & Bello, 23 Intl Law at 527 (cited in note 37). See also Jackson & Davey at
156-57 (cited in note 7). The USTR is squarely within the executive branch; the head of the
USTR is a cabinet officer.
62. See Holmer & Bello, 23 Intl Law at 528 (cited in note 37):
The 1988 Trade Act does amend Section 301 significantly. It is intended to make it
harder for the Executive Branch to sit on its hands and do nothing (or next to nothing)
in response to a foreign government's unfair trade practices. But although it increases
pressure on the Executive to act (and act decisively), it preserves sufficient discretion to
ensure that such action can be judicious and trade liberalizing.
63. Id at 528. Mandatory retaliation will be discussed below.
64. See generally Note, Labor Rights Conditionality: United States Trade Legislation and
the International Trade Order, 65 NYU L Rev 79 (1990).
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other factors cause Section 301 investigations to discriminate among
nations that allow an open flow of information. 65
A. Does Section 301 Violate the GATT Principle of Multilateralism?
1. The Meaning of Multilateralism
Although GATT's articles do not define "multilateralism" or set out
minimum requirements for compliance, the principle of multilateralism is
central to the GATT accords. Multilateralism presumes that GATT
members will take trade grievances to GATT or to some other appropri-
ate international body. It also presumes that members will refrain from
entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements that exclude other mem-
bers and will refrain from taking unilateral retaliatory actions.
In reality, most GATT members do not have exemplary multilateral
records. Multilateralism remains viable, however, because no country
wants to oppose a united GATT body. Countries thus have an incentive
to make their laws follow the GATT accords.
Although the OTCA changes to Section 301 have generated new
informal complaints, 66 Section 301 has always provoked criticism from
trading partners. 67 Although informal reaction is not conclusive, it is rel-
evant in assessing the GATT-consistency of Section 301 because foreign
trading partners will be the judges should GATT litigation occur. In for-
mal terms, Section 301 has a spotless record: no GATT panel has ever
declared that any part of the statute violated the multilateral tenets of the
GATT accords. 68 The analysis below will focus on whether the OTCA
amendments to Section 301 are likely to result in a formal GATT censure
of U.S. trade policy.
65. Foreign trading partners might also challenge Section 301 in forums outside of GATT.
The U.S. has signed a number of international treaties and agreements imposing obligations upon
the U.S. See generally Fisher & Steinhardt, 14 L & Policy Intl Bus at 569 (cited in note 28).
Additionally, if the U.S. were to enter a period where a moderate Congress found itself
restraining a protectionist president, foreign trading partners might be able to obtain judicial
review of retaliatory actions taken under Section 301. See generally Erwin P. Eichmann and
Gary N. Horlick, Political Questions in International Trade: Judicial Review of Section 301? 10
Mich J Intl L 735 (1989).
66. India, Japan, and members of the European Community have separately threatened to
take Section 301 to GATT. See Dick K. Nanto, Japan's Response to the Omnibus Trade Act,
1989 BYU L Rev 517.
67. See, for example, Selective Safeguard Measures at 168 (cited in note 38). U.S. trading
partners, notably members of the European Community, complained bitterly when Section 301
was first created in 1974.
68. GAiT has resorted to formal retaliation on only one occasion; Section 301 did not
exist at the time.
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2. Moderate Language and Action Under the OTCA
In several key areas, the OTCA has retained or improved the GATT-
consistency of Section 301. First, Congress preserved presidential author-
ity to negotiate directly with trading partners. Second, Congress rejected
amendments that would have occasionally called for mandatory retalia-
tion. Third, Congress refrained from passing several other provisions that
might have threatened the GATT-consistency of the OTCA. Finally, and
significantly, the executive branch has exercised restraint in applying Sec-
tion 301.
The first principal feature of the OTCA, the renewal of presidential
"fast-track" authority to negotiate and conclude trade agreements, 69 is
sufficiently important that Holmer & Bello termed it the "centerpiece" of
the OTCA.70 "Fast-track" authority, first granted in the Trade Act of
1974,71 enhances the U.S. commitment to multilateralism by helping to
reduce the frustrations foreign nations face in negotiating with the Ameri-
can system of divided governmental authority. Before 1974, Congress
sometimes unraveled agreements worked out at length between the execu-
tive branch and foreign trading partners. Fast track authority makes con-
gressional approval both more rapid and more likely.72 Congress granted
it to better enable U.S. negotiators to expand GATT into new areas.7' By
renewing fast-track authority, Congress continues to demonstrate a desire
that the U.S. cooperate closely with its trading partners.
In a second important concession to multilateralism, the OTCA
stops short of requiring mandatory retaliation under Section 301. During
early legislative debate, both houses wanted mandatory retaliation in a
broad range of areas but eventually settled for a different result: more
69. Birenbaum, 10 U Pa J Intl Bus L at 658 (cited in note 18). Fast-track authority was
extended until May 31, 1991, and can be renewed for two additional years pending congressional
approval.
70. Holmer & Bello, 23 Intl Law at 526 (cited in note 37); Birenbaum, 10 U Pa J Intl Bus L
at 658 (cited in note 18).
71. Holmer & Bello, 23 Intl Law at 526.
72. Id.
73. See notes 170-76 and accompanying text discussing negotiation in new areas. See also
Hollings, NY Times A15 (March 26, 1991) (cited in note 19).
Some members of Congress have opposed the granting of fast-track powers. For example,
Senator Hollings, opposing the grant of fast-track authority to negotiate the United States-
Mexico free trade agreement pointed out that Soviet arms agreements must withstand
congressional scrutiny and that Congress is explicitly charged with regulating trade under the
Commerce Clause.
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aggressive enforcement of existing trade law coupled with greater trans-
parency in the application of Section 301."4
Congress has opted for more traditional, more political means of
limiting executive discretion: tight time tables for action, trans-
parency in the form of reports and published findings, legislative
policy directives, and political pressure points in the form of
waiver decisions. A determined president could resist all of the
above legally, but would do so-assuming continued, massive
deficits-at his political peril."
When the USTR finds that a foreign trading partner has not violated
any international trade agreement, the USTR retains unlimited power to
forgo retaliation under Section 301.76 When the USTR finds a violation
of U.S. rights under an international trade agreement, the OTCA on its
face appears to require mandatory investigation, and where applicable,
mandatory retaliation under Section 301.7" This is the so-called "Super
301" procedure.7" Ultimately, however, the USTR retains authority to
waive even a mandatory action on several grounds. For example, the
USTR can waive action if a GATT panel finds that U.S. rights under the
accords have not been violated.79 In short, at least to the extent that the
USTR and the president forgo unilateral action, the OTCA additions to
Section 301 on "mandatory retaliation" are consistent with U.S. obliga-
tions under the GATT accords.
74. Birenbaum, 10 U Pa J Intl Bus L at 657 (cited in note 18). See also Selective Safeguard
Measures at 199 (cited in note 38), discussing proposed amendments to previous trade bills aimed
at curtailing the president's power to halt retaliation. Notably, Sen. Dole in 1979 attempted
unsuccessfully to bring Section 301 under the jurisdiction of the International Trade Commission
(ITC), an independent agency. Dole proposed giving the president the power to review ITC
actions but leaving Congress with final say.
75. Birenbaum, 10 U Pa J Intl Bus L at 658 (cited in note 18).
76. A. Jane Bradley, The "Super 301" Process 2 (Commercial Law and Practice Course
Handbook Series, Trade Law and Policy Institute, Practicing Law Institute (PLI) Order No. A4-
4276, 1989) (summarizing 19 USC § 2411(a) (1990)).
77. 19 USC § 2411(a) (1990).
78. Carl Svernlov, The Implementation of "Super 301." Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act, § 301, 19 USC § 2411 (Supp VII 1989), 31 Harv Intl L J 359, 360 (1990).
See also Bradley, The "Super 301" Process at 2 (cited in note 76) (the Super 301 process was
required only in 1989 and 1990, although the possibility of renewal is occasionally mentioned in
print).
79. 19 USC § 2411(b) (1990). Under the statute, the USTR may also suspend mandatory
retaliation if the targeted nation agrees to halt the objectionable practice or provides
compensation, if the USTR determines in "extraordinary" cases that Section 301 action would
hurt more than help the economy, or if the USTR determines that a Section 301 action would
seriously harm national security. Suspension of retaliation is not necessarily permanent. See also
Bradley, The "Super 301" Process at 1 (cited in note 76): "If non-compliance with the agreement
is later found, the USTR must continue the investigation as though it had not been suspended."
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Third, Congress refrained from attaching a number of additional
amendments to the OTCA that would have threatened GATT-consis-
tency. Some of these proposals, relating to areas such as customs fraud,
countervailing duties, and anti-dumping, would not have fallen directly
under Section 301 and are beyond the scope of this paper. 80 One proposal
that would have come under Section 301 was the controversial "Gephardt
Amendment." This amendment would have required targeted nations to
reduce "excessive and unwarranted" trade surpluses with the United
States by ten percent per year.81 In summary, the OTCA could easily
have become a stronger and more provocative bill.
If Section 301 remains GATT-consistent after passage of the OTCA,
the most significant factor will probably be the restraint of the president
and the USTR in using Section 301's retaliatory authority. The USTR in
1989 threatened to initiate but eventually decided against "Super 301"
investigations of Indian insurance and investment restrictions, Brazilian
import barriers and licensing requirements, and Japanese policies on for-
est products and government procurement of satellites and supercom-
puters.82 Because no GATT member has challenged Section 301, the
statute arguably remains consistent with the multilateral principle of the
accords.
83
80. See Holmer & Bello, 23 Intl Law at 525 (cited in note 38). Congress considered but
ultimately rejected amendments which would have created a broader definition for "subsidy" in
the countervailing duty laws and applied the laws to non-market economies. Congress resisted
the temptation to establish a private cause of action in U.S. courts for anti-dumping and to
provide relief against diversionary "upstream" or "downstream" dumping in violation of existing
international rules. Congress also decided against allowing a private cause of action in U.S.
courts for customs fraud and chose not to pass a provision which would have excluded all repeat
offenders of U.S. customs laws from U.S. markets. The authors list other provisions kept out of
the OTCA.
81. Id at 530. However, see Julia Christine Bliss, The Amendments to Section 301: An
Overview and Suggested Strategies for Foreign Response, 20 L & Policy Intl Bus 501, 522 (1989),
arguing that the bill contains a "Gephardt element," establishing the precedent of responding to
the trade practices of a foreign country on an aggregate basis.
82. US. Confirms End of Super 301 Dispute, Jiji Press Ticker Service (Oct. 3, 1990). See
also Svernlov, 31 Harv Intl L J at 362 (cited in note 78): "The combination of a lobbying blitz
and a last-minute flurry of trade concessions enabled South Korea and Taiwan to narrowly
escape being named to the [priority] list." Svernlov adds, at 366, that Japan had to be on the list
to appease Congress, and other countries were added so as not to single out Japan.
83. In short, whereas the use of Super 301 might create a cause of action under GATT, the
threatened use of the statute would appear to offer no cause of action under the accords. If
unilateral retaliation could be analogized to battery under tort law, perhaps threatened unilateral
retaliation would compare with assault. GATT members coerced into granting overly generous
trade concessions might welcome such a cause of action. However, a formal rule would probably
be unprecedented in diplomacy, detrimental to dialogue, and difficult to apply.
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B. Does Section 301 Violate the GA 77 Principle of Nondiscrimination?
1. The Problem of Discrimination
Article I of GATT sets forth the principle of nondiscrimination,
which, along with multilateralism, is central to the GATT accords. The
Article I nondiscrimination provision contains a most-favored-nation
(MFN) clause requiring that new trade concessions offered to one GATT
member be extended equally to all other GATT members. s4 GATT does
not enforce unconditional MFN rules, however. According to one
explanation,
Unconditional MFN requires that one nation agree to 'extend to
another the most favorable trade concessions [the former] has
granted, or may grant, to any third country' in some other
future or existing agreement, regardless of whether the latter
nation is giving the former nation any future concessions in
return.8a
GATT sometimes allows deviation from pure nondiscrimination, such as
in "free-trade" agreements where parties extend concessions only on a
reciprocal basis.86 In another deviation, GATT does not require equal
trade barriers among all nations; it only requires equal treatment in grant-
ing new concessions."
Discrimination under GATT might take one of two forms. First,
Section 301 could violate GATT by discriminating against "open" coun-
tries, i.e., countries which allow the free flow of information necessary for
investigating a Section 301 complaint.88 There is an ironic twist to this
form of discrimination: "open" trading partners may be unfairly singled
out for Section 301 actions. This is because "closed" countries (i.e., those
which impede or eliminate reliable sources of information)89 may cripple
84. GATT, Art I (cited in note 2).
85. Aho at 27 (cited in note 8).
86. "Free-trade" agreements are a controversial topic. See generally, Robert J. Morris, An
Open Trade Alternative for the Next President, 6 Brookings Review 3 (Brookings Institution,
1988) (discussing appropriate U.S. policies or responses).
87. See Jackson & Davey at 300-01 (cited in note 7). A nation is allowed to maintain a
discriminatory trade law if the law existed before the nation joined GATT and if the law does not
allow flexibility in application (e.g., presidential discretion).
88. Note, 65 NYU L Rev at 109-13 (cited in note 64).
89. Id at 110. China and Syria, for example, bar all access to information on alleged labor
rights abuses, potentially actionable under Section 301.
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the fact-finding process. At least one country has complained informally
about the matter.90
Moreover, when "closed" countries limit communication, the poten-
tial unreliability of the remaining sources of information may lead to dis-
crimination under GATT in one of two ways. First, because closed
countries are likely to have fewer whistle-blowers, a" labor rights abuses in
closed countries are less likely to come to the attention of the USTR.
Second, in a closed country, biased sources of information may be more
able to skew the fact-finding process. Although investigations in open
countries are also vulnerable to bias, the USTR in closed countries may
have no other means of collecting corroborating data. Consequently, the
USTR may be more inclined to drop investigations against closed coun-
tries and thus potentially discriminate under GATT.92
Regardless of whether Section 301 discriminates against open coun-
tries, Section 301 may also discriminate among open countries. Such dis-
crimination may be deliberate and politically motivated. When the
USTR wants to favor a country, for example,
The primary tactic has been refusal to review a petition, and in
cases in which a petition is reviewed, the USTR has issued eva-
sive decisions .... The decisions often rely upon unsupported
assertions by the government being investigated and appear to
interpret the law such that some progress ... is sufficient for
compliance.
93
A Section 301 investigation by itself is arguably a form of retaliation
because it is politically embarrassing and requires responses that are
expensive to administer.9a Section 301's choice of investigatory targets
90. Id at 111-12. Taiwan raised the objection in connection with Section 301 treatment of
labor rights issues.
91. According to a former AFL-CIO staff member, dissidents and labor rights leaders often
provide the only information available on labor rights abuses in closed countries. Id at 110
(quoting a telephone interview with a former staff member of the AFL-CIO Free Trade Union
Institute).
92. It is difficult to know whether the issue of discrimination between open and closed
countries arises only in the area of labor rights or whether the issue threatens the GATT-
consistency of Section 301 investigations unrelated to labor. Labor rights violations are a new
cause of action under Section 301, having been introduced by the OTCA. Whether Section 301
has taken a step toward discriminating between open and closed countries may therefore depend
upon whether labor rights issues are more likely than other trade issues to involve biased sources
of information.
93. Note, 65 NYU L Rev at 119 (cited in note 64).
94. See Comment, 81 Nw U L Rev at 524 (cited in note 24): "Administrative costs include
the procedural costs of preparing petitions, conducting investigations, and conducting
negotiations." See also John H. Jackson, Perspectives on the Jurisprudence of International
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depends upon the initiative of private parties or the USTR95 who must in
turn rely upon whatever information is available. Section 301's present
method of selecting investigatory targets, by allowing potentially inaccu-
rate or insufficient information to create bias against some nations, may
thus be inadvertently discriminatory under GATT.
96
2. OTCA's Effect on Reducing Section 301 Discrimination
If Section 301 discriminates under GATT, the question becomes how
to improve the statute's consistency with the GATT accords. One possi-
ble way of ameliorating discrimination between open and closed countries
might be to establish looser evidentiary requirements for Section 301
investigations against closed countries. To reduce other potentially dis-
criminatory aspects of Section 301, several additional suggestions have
been made. One partial remedy, considered by Congress before passage
of the OTCA, would be a regular and automatic review of all trading
partners. 97 An automatic, country-specific review might preempt claims
that Section 301 authorized the executive branch to rely on insufficient or
inaccurate information in selecting targets for investigation. When a
trade issue aroused public passions, automatic review might ensure that
the issue received attention while simultaneously protecting the Section
301 process from the political winds of the moment. However, automatic
review would probably not eliminate concerns about deliberate discrimi-
nation and would probably be costly. 98
Another suggested remedy would be to have an impartial interna-
tional agency gather information for Section 301 actions.99 GATT itself
would be a natural fact-finding body for disputes involving trade in goods,
although most GATT members would probably be unwilling to reorgan-
ize the GATT apparatus to serve U.S. retaliatory goals.
One final suggestion for improving GATT-consistency would be to
require a more precise articulation of USTR rules and policies under Sec-
Trade: Costs and Benefits of Legal Procedures in the United States, 82 Mich L Rev 1570, 1581
(1984). Foreign trading partners would be compelled to bear some of these costs.
95. Note, 65 NYU L Rev at 79 (cited in note 64).
96. See id at 112.
97. Id.
98. See Comment, 81 Nw U L Rev at 528-33 (cited in note 24). The administrative costs
would probably escalate if the USTR began investigating nontariff barriers. See id at 528-30
(describing cases where the USTR has attempted to address "strategic trade barriers"). As tariff
barriers are broken down, attention almost inevitably turns to nontariff barriers; however, the
USTR does not presently employ staff around the world for investigating such trade problems.
99. Note, 65 NYU L Rev at 124 (cited in note 64).
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tion 301."'° Any set of detailed rules would still leave opportunities for
Congress to insert discriminatory trip wires into Section 301. However, a
more transparent and predictable process might reduce the ability of the
executive branch to discriminate intentionally while also giving foreign
governments better opportunities to suggest ways of eliminating inadver-
tent discrimination.
If an open investigatory process reduces discrimination, Section 301
has made steady progress toward compliance with GATT. In 1974, Con-
gress considered but ultimately decided against requiring the president to
publish all retaliatory measures and accompanying rationales. °1 The
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 added a requirement that the USTR prepare
annual reports identifying and estimating the impact of significant foreign
trade barriers, and where appropriate, articulating reasons for not taking
action under Section 301.
The OTCA has intensified the reporting requirements. The USTR
must now report on foreign compliance with the Subsidies Code, for
example,' 02 and must continue to estimate the value of trade lost due to
significant barriers. 0 3 The USTR must also identify "priority practices"
and "priority countries,"' 1 4 and upon so finding, must initiate investiga-
tions within 21 days. 0 5 Furthermore, the Treasury must give Congress a
written report on exchange rate policy.106 These reporting requirements
accompany the ones already contained in the statutory procedure for halt-
ing "mandatory" retaliation.10 7 Moreover, the statute now defines the
key word "unreasonable" in considerably greater detail. 108 Ironically,
many members of Congress supporting stricter reporting requirements
were motivated more by a desire to prompt retaliation than by any urge to
promote consistency with GATT. Nevertheless, the OTCA reporting
100. See id at 124 (again discussing Section 301 only in the context of labor rights). The
author posits sample questions for the USTR to resolve: "Could there be and what would
establish a prima facie case of labor violations? What constitutes 'taking steps' to ameliorate
labor rights conditions? What is required to show a proximate link between rights violations and
an effect or burden on United States commerce?"
101. Hudec, 59 Minn L Rev at 517 (cited in note 17).
102. Birenbaum, 10 U Pa J Intl Bus L at 656 (cited in note 18).
103. Id (citing Trade Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-618, 88 Stat 1978 (1974)).
104. Svernlov, 31 Harv Intl L J at 361 (cited in note 78). See also Holmer & Bello, 23 Intl
Law at 529 (cited in note 37) (adding that the number of investigations required under Super 301
is unspecified).
105. Svernlov, 31 Harv Intl L J at 360 (cited in note 78).
106. Birenbaum, 10 U Pa J Intl Bus L at 656 (cited in note 18).
107. See 19 USC § 2411(b) (1990).
108. See 19 USC § 241 l(d)(3) (1990).
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requirements bring greater openness to Section 301, arguably making the
statute less discriminatory than before.
ii. UNITED STATES LEGAL OPTIONS
When the U.S. wants to take action in a trade area potentially involv-
ing Section 301, three options exist.1 0 9 First, where applicable, the U.S.
can forgo Section 301 and opt for provisions existing under both GATT
and U.S. law that allow temporary protection for seriously troubled
industries. Second, the U.S. can avoid Section 301 and complain under
Article XXIII of GATT that a trading partner has taken actions that
nullify or impair trade benefits under the GATT accords. Third, the U.S.
can employ Section 301 and take retaliatory action on grounds that a
trading partner has behaved in an "unreasonable" manner.
A. Avoiding Section 301
1. Emergency Escape Clauses: Section 201 & Article XIX
When the executive branch wants to temporarily protect seriously
troubled American industries without resorting to Section 301 retaliation,
Article XIX of GATT and Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 offer
alternatives which predate the OTCA. Both options allow the U.S. to
suspend trade benefits. Although Section 201 does not require a compen-
satory grant of concessions,' 10 countries employing Article XIX generally
do this as a matter of course.1 11 When countries employing Article XIX
fail to offer compensatory concessions, Article XIX(3) allows affected
countries to withdraw their own concessions of equivalent value. Article
XIX(3) is rarely invoked and carries an implication of sanction, 112 but the
U.S. has used Article XIX(3) to such effect.
1 13
109. See generally Hudec, 59 Minn L Rev at 522-26 (cited in note 17).
110. Holmer & Bello, 23 Intl Law at 531-32 (cited in note 37).
111. Hudec, 59 Minn L Rev at 508 (cited in note 17).
112. Id.
113. See id at 535-39, describing "the Cattle War." After a sharp drop in U.S. cattle prices
prompted a surge in exports to Canada, the Canadians reacted with a tariff, a health restriction,
and finally an Article XIX withdrawal of import concessions. The U.S. responded by blasting
Canada under Section 252 of the U.S. trade law for allegedly violating Article XI of GATT. In
its domestic justification for action, the U.S. did not mention its rights under Article XIX(3).
When the U.S. reported the action to GATT several days later, however, the U.S cited only
Article XIX(3) while omitting mention of Article XI. The Article XIX(3) action thus implied
but did not declare a retaliatory motive.
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The OTCA overhaul of U.S. trade law brings little change to Section
201.114 As before, Section 201 can be applied only with the joint approval
of the president and the International Trade Commission.115 Section 201
may irritate trading partners if overused but will not violate the GATT
accords.1 16 In fact, the theme of Section 201-adjustment rather than
protectionism 17-may offer opportunities to reduce the political tension
surrounding Section 301 by temporarily removing some matters from Sec-
tion 301 jurisdiction.1 8 Where the executive branch is willing to forgo
rhetoric to protect a seriously troubled domestic industry, Section 201 can
help the GATT-consistency of Section 301 by defusing the retaliatory
character of the Section 301 process. 19
2. Article XXIII of GA TI. Nullification & Impairment
A second alternative to using Section 301 is to make a claim of "nul-
lification and impairment" under GATT. Under Article XXIII, a mem-
ber-nation has a cause of action whenever any "benefit" accorded under
GATT has been "nullified" or "impaired" by another member-nation.12 °
Nullification and impairment can be a cause of action under GATT
whether or not the disputed benefit arose from GATT negotiations 21 or
114. Holmer & Bello, 23 Intl Law at 531 (cited in note 37).
115. Id at 532.
116. See Hudec, 59 Minn L Rev at 523 (cited in note 17): "Retaliation of this kind would
obviously be the "cleanest" from a GATT point of view. There is no question as to the right to
retaliate, or the right to act unilaterally."
117. Holmer & Bello, 23 Intl Law at 528 (cited in note 37).
118. See Selective Safeguard Measures at 209 (cited in note 38) (describing the U.S. taking a
defensive remedy to avoid a Section 301 offensive action).
119. For additional discussion, see Jeffrey M. Lang, Changes Made by the Omnibus Trade
And Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-418) in the Import Relief Provisions of Pre-
Existing Law (Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, Trade Law and Policy
Institute, Practicing Law Institute (PLI) Order No. A4-4276, 1989).
120. GATT, Art XXIII(1) (cited in note 2) reads as follows:
"I. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any
objective of the Agreement is being impeded as a result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this
Agreement, or
(b) the application by another party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with
the provisions or this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written
representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be
concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the
representations or proposals made to it."
See also Hudec, 59 Minn L Rev at 474-77 (cited in note 17) (discussing "benefit").
121. GATT, Art XXIII(l)(b).
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any other formal accord.122 Not defined at the time of GATT's creation,
nullification and impairment became "a grant of common-law jurisdiction
to fashion a definition as disputed cases arose." 
12 3
Early resolutions of nullification and impairment issues quickly
established that the doctrine at a minimum applied whenever a country
"reasonably anticipated" the continuation of an existing trade benefit. 124
In a typical dispute occurring in 1952, Norway based a successful cause of
action on a claim that German negotiators had recognized and promised
to address an imbalance involving Norwegian sardines. 125 Norway won
by showing reliance-inducing conduct on the part of the German
negotiators. 126
GATT's remedies for nullification and impairment may take the
form of a legal ruling, a recommendation for corrective action, or an
authorization for the injured country to withdraw reciprocal trade con-
cessions. 127  GATT was designed to authorize only "compensatory"
restrictions and not "sanctions,"1 2 ' relying instead on a sense of commu-
nity to enforce results. 129 The formal remedy for nullification and impair-
ment is the same whether or not a GATT panel finds "legal"
violations. 130
Several conditions may preempt a claim of nullification and impair-
ment. First, under the "reasonable anticipation" test, a cause of action
disappears if a benefit was withdrawn long ago or has long appeared likely
to be withdrawn.'31 Second, a claim of nullification and impairment must
show an "imbalance of reciprocity, [meaning that] the complaining party
must show that it has paid for the benefits impaired."' I32 Perhaps the
most significant limitation on nullification and impairment is that the vast
majority of claims brought to GATT have only concerned benefits in the
122. GATT, Art XXIII(l)(c). See also Hudec, 59 Minn L Rev at 471-77 (cited in note 17)
(describing early debate over the nullification and impairment doctrine). Most countries were
reluctant to grant strong coercive power to GATT, especially when the nullification doctrine was
vaguely defined. Some countries wanted to limit the scope of nullification and impairment to
breaches of clearly defined legal obligations. A number of countries also wanted to limit the
remedy to calls for consultations whenever no violation of the GATT charter was involved.
123. Hudec, 59 Minn L Rev at 480 (cited in note 17).
124. Id at 486-87.
125. Id at 491-93.
126. Id at 482.
127. GATT, Art XXIII(2) (cited in note 2).
128. Hudec, 59 Minn L Rev at 468 (cited in note 17).
129. Id at 481-82.
130. Id at 468.
131. Id at 530.
132. Id at 503.
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form of tariff concessions.133 On the other hand, nothing would appear to
bar a claim against a nontariff barrier: the doctrine could conceivably
cover "any new measure which had the effect of raising the level of artifi-
cial disadvantage which might be said to impair that benefit." 13 4 In 1961,
Uruguay tried to extend the doctrine into nontariff areas,13 5 and more
recently the U.S. has declared that unfair labor practices could constitute
a nullification claim under existing provisions.
13 6
Past GATT negotiations have probably emphasized tariffs because
tariffs are more easily measured and compared than nontariff barriers. 
137
Moreover, at least until recently, GATT's tendency to focus on the tariff
aspects of nullification and impairment has probably advanced U.S. inter-
ests.13 ' Global tariffs are now lower, however, and pressing this area in
the case of many nations will no longer be practical. Significantly, Japan's
tariffs now average roughly 3%, the lowest level in the developed
world. 139
As a result, the U.S. is focusing on the many remaining nontariff
barriers. The U.S. receives criticism for imposing nontariff barriers such
as Voluntary Restraint Agreements,' 4° but the U.S. and other countries
have been discussing nontariff barriers in GATT since the Tokyo
Round. 1' If productive, this focus on nontariff barriers in GATT could
significantly reduce the urge to rely on unilateral measures under Section
301.
133. Id at 500. See also id at 524-25: "In nonviolation cases, the claim of tariff concessions
is really the only established theory there is."
134. Id at 487 (emphasis in the original).
135. Id at 497. Uruguay declared that 15 countries were committing 562 trade restrictions,
each affecting a major Uruguayan export. This marks GATT's only formal experience with a
nullification claim extending beyond tariff issues. The GATT panel decided against Uruguay not
because Uruguay alleged nontariff claims but because Uruguay refused to take a specific legal
stand on any of its grievances or support its complaints with sufficient evidence.
136. Note, 65 NYU L Rev at 91 (cited in note 64).
137. See Hudec, 59 Minn L Rev at 500 (cited in note 17): "The concentration on tariffs is
understandable. The tariff concession is different from other GATT legal obligations, because it
is the only obligation paid for in cash."
138. According to Hudec, id at 525,
It should be possible to channel many grievances into this narrower [tariff] type of
concession claim. If there were, for example, a grievance based upon some legal but
'unreasonable' local regulation affecting a wide range of U.S. products, U.S. officials
could simply search out one or more tariff concessions arguably nullified by the
offending regulation.
139. Comment, 81 Nw U L Rev at 526 (cited in note 24).
140. Selective Safeguard Measures at 167 (cited in note 38).
141. Jackson & Davey at 326 (cited in note 7).
Winter 1992]
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
B. Using Section 301 on "Unreasonable" Trade Practices
When the U.S. is unable or unwilling to take action under Section
201 or GATT Articles XIX or XXIII, the remaining legal option is uni-
lateral retaliation under statutes covering selected subject areas'42 or
more generally under Section 301. Section 301 mostly overlaps with
international law. 143 One option created under the Trade Act of 1974,
however, 1 ' -the right of retaliation against "unreasonable" foreign trade
practices-has always held the potential for conflict with GATTr.145 The
definition supplied by Congress in 1984 declared "unreasonable" to mean
any practice which denies fair or equitable market opportuni-
ties, opportunities for the establishment of an enterprise, or pro-
vision of adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights. 146
This definition may have generated more questions than it answered.147
The OTCA expands the definition of "unreasonable" from 74 to 403
words 48 and creates new potential for conflict with GATT. First,
"unreasonable" now includes "export targeting," a term encompassing
any government plan or scheme consisting of a combination of
coordinated actions ... that are bestowed on a specific enter-
prise, industry, or group thereof, the effect of which is to assist
the enterprise, industry, or group to become more competitive
in the export of a class or kind of merchandise. 149
No article of GATT appears to forbid export targeting. Consequently,
Section 301's cause of action against export targeting, if used, would prob-
ably violate GATT's principle of multilateralism.
Second, the concept of "unreasonable" under the OTCA has now
been expanded to permit a revocation of certain U.S.-conferred trade and
142. See, for example, Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 pertaining to intellectual
property issues.
143. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
144. Selective Safeguard Measures at 167 (cited in note 38).
145. Robert Hudee wrote in 1975 that retaliation against "unreasonable" trading practices
could go beyond GATT rules and was thus "the most questionable form of retaliation by GATT
standards." Hudec, 59 Minn L Rev at 518, 525 (cited in note 17). See also Fisher & Steinhardt,
14 L & Policy Intl Bus at 597 (cited in note 28).
146. Selective Safeguard Measures at 164 (cited in note 38) (citing 19 USC § 2411(e)
(1990), as amended by Section 304(0(2) of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984).
147. See Comment, 81 Nw U L Rev at 504 (cited in note 24) (discussing possible
interpretations of the 1984 language).
148. 19 USC § 2411(d)(3)(B)(iii) (1990).
149. 19 USC § 2411(b)(3)(E) (1990).
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developmental benefits against foreign countries that allow labor rights
abuses.1 50 These abuses may include any pattern of persistent conduct
that denies workers the right of association or collective bargaining, per-
mits forced labor, or fails to provide minimum standards for work hours,
child labor, health, or safety. 15 1 The rationale for this cause of action is
that "suppression of foreign worker rights causes injury to U.S. workers
and industry through the medium of international trade and
investment."
152
Before 1988, GATT members were immune from U.S. laws against
foreign labor rights abuses.1 53 The OTCA changes to Section 301 do not
compel the USTR to retaliate against labor rights abuses. 154 The OTCA's
Section 301 labor rights provisions affect GATT members for the first
time, however, and if used, would probably violate the GATT accords.
1 5 5
III. STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS FOR SECTION 301
A. Drawbacks of Section 301
Several arguments favor limiting the scope of Section 301. Some
critics believe Section 301 focuses on fairness at the expense of results.
Moreover, the OTCA labor rights provisions face strong foreign opposi-
tion, and the U.S. could jeopardize economic advantages by pushing the
issue. Finally, Section 301 may conflict with foreign aid policies.
Some opponents of Section 301 argue that focusing on fairness, while
emotionally satisfying, does nothing to solve U.S. trade problems. "Fair-
ness is a potent political concept, and the perceived lack of it can mobilize
deep resentment in otherwise trade-indifferent Americans," says one critic
who adds, "[t]here is no reason whatever to think that 'fair' or even free
trade will inevitably result in balanced trade for any particular coun-
150. See Note, In Pursuit of the Missing Link. International Worker Rights and
International Trade? 27 Colum J Transnatl L 443, 444 (1989).
151. See 19 USC § 2411(d)(3)(B)(iii) (1990).
152. Note, 27 Colum J Transnatl L at 454 (cited in note 150). See also Note, 65 NYU L
Rev at 105 (cited in note 64) (citing legislative desire that "the denial of worker rights should not
be a means for a country or its industries to gain competitive advantage in international trade").
153. Note, 65 NYU L Rev at 83 (cited in note 64).
154. The OTCA revision of Section 301 gives the USTR a vaguely-worded option of
overlooking labor rights abuses when "such acts, policies, and practices are not inconsistent with
the level of economic development of the foreign country." 19 USC § 241 1(b)(3)(C)(i)(II).
155. Note, 65 NYU L Rev at 96 (cited in note 64).
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try.' 5 6 Critics of Section 301 often blame savings and investment pat-
terns for U.S. trade imbalances.' 57
The greatest hesitation in using Section 301 is that foreign trading
partners may retaliate and thus compromise the advantages of the MFN
system. MFN relies on the theory that imports should come from the
cheapest source.' 5 ' MFN is also simpler to administer than a tariff sys-
tem, requiring less legislative, legal, and official effort. I5 9 In practical
terms, MFN allows U.S. firms to gain access to foreign export markets,
and the U.S. government thus has strong incentives to avoid provoking
GATT retaliation.
Theoretically, the U.S. could target labor rights abuses under Section
301 in such a way as to minimize conflict with GATT. One suggested
approach is to focus Section 301 on union rights. According to this argu-
ment, targeting union rights best avoids protectionism or violation of for-
eign sovereignty, since union rights require only cessation of state action
as opposed to mandating minimum wages, maximum hours, or health
standards. 16
0
Nevertheless, the labor rights provisions in Section 301 have the
potential to provoke strong retaliation. One problem is that the provi-
sions appear hypocritical to many GATT members, partly as the U.S. has
only recently adopted many of the required changes. 161 An additional
foreign concern is that labor rights provisions may conceal ulterior pro-
tectionist motives. 162 Many trading partners appear willing to sacrifice
U.S. markets to avoid Section 301 labor requirements. 163 In any case,
when the U.S. in 1987 proposed to establish an advisory committee in
GATT to deal with labor issues, most members were reluctant to cooper-
ate. 164 Most members of GATT would probably be unsympathetic
156. Morris, 6 Brookings Review at 18, 21 (cited in note 86).
157. Id at 18. See also Svernlov, 31 Harv Intl L J at 366 (cited in note 78): "The trade
deficit is largely driven by the federal deficit and the corollary tendency for the United States
government and public to consume rather than save."
158. Aho, 22 Cornell Intl L J at 27 (cited in note 8).
159. Id at 28.
160. See Note, 27 Colum J Transnatl L at 461-63 (cited in note 150) (citing authority).
161. See Note, Labor Law Preemption Under Section 301: New Rules for an Old Game, 40
Syracuse L Rev 1279, 1279 (1989). Few workplace regulations protected individual rights of
U.S. workers before the NLRA in 1935, and much existing regulation has been enacted within
the past ten years.
162. Note, 65 NYU L Rev at 94 (cited in note 64).
163. Id at 107. See also Note, 27 Colum J Transnatl L at 448-449 (cited in note 150).
164. Note, 65 NYU L Rev at 94 (cited in note 64).
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toward an American attempt to target labor rights abuses under Section
301.
Beyond the disadvantages of conflicting with GATT, one final hesita-
tion in using Section 301 is that trade retaliation may undercut U.S. for-
eign aid policies. In some cases, perhaps the appropriate question is
whether the law should allow a U.S. industry or company to influence or
override foreign aid goals. Recently, for example, the administration tem-
porarily placed India on the Super 301 list for restricting foreign insur-
ance companies.1 6' Although India may have had valid reasons for
protecting domestic insurance and limiting the outflow of foreign capital,
Section 301 does not require the USTR to determine whether trade retali-
ation conflicts with foreign aid goals. Arguably, Section 301 investiga-
tions should call for such a showing.
B. Using Section 301 to Improve Drawbacks of GA TT
Although Section 301 has shortcomings, the drawbacks of GATT do
much to explain the congressional urge to act in the trade area. GATT
can be frustratingly slow; one senator recently dubbed it "the Gentle-
men's Agreement to Talk and Talk."1 66 Moreover, the United States
often disagrees with GATT's results.1 67 GATT may also be outmoded.
Some critics note that GATT was promulgated at a time of rapid trade
expansion that is no longer occurring.1 68 Critics have long faulted GATT
for encouraging parties to base negotiations on existing tariffs, a system
which has favored parties already having high tariffs.1 69 GATT's recent
successes in leveling global tariffs, however, have sharpened attention on
remaining nontariff barriers. Whether GATT remains viable will depend
on how well GATT responds to nontariff problems.
165. See U.S. Confirms End of Super 301 Dispute, Jiji Press Ticker Service (Oct. 3, 1990).
See also Fisher & Steinhardt, 14 L & Policy Intl Bus at 590-91 (cited in note 28) (discussing a
prior insurance dispute between the U.S. and Korea).
166. Holmer & Bello, 23 Intl Law at 527 (cited in note 37). See also Robert E. Hudec,
GA 7T or GABB? The Future Design of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 80 Yale L J
1299 (1971).
167. See for example Jackson & Davey at 311 (cited in note 7). According to the authors,
"the United States is increasingly outvoted in a GATT with 91 members, over two-thirds of
which are developing countries, and over two-thirds of which are formally associated in one
status or another with the European Community.
168. See Selective Safeguard Measures at 212-17 (cited in note 38) (arguing that GATT was
created in response to the Great Depression).
169. Id at 171-72.
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Until now, GATT has covered only trade in goods.17 ° GATT
ignores substantial areas of international commerce, only some of which
are covered by multilateral mechanisms such as the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) or the Multilateral Trade Negotiation (MTN) Codes.171
Other areas are largely devoid of law. The president has fast-track172
authority to negotiate the main U.S. objectives in the Uruguay Round:
improving GATT rules for agriculture and expanding GATT to cover
services, intellectual property, and investment. 173 However, achieving
agreement promises to be difficult. "Certain developing countries remain
opposed to assuming almost any new obligations in GATT regarding, for
example, trade in services, intellectual property protection, and, almost
without exception, investment."' 74 Moreover, the 1992 European Com-
munity merger is preoccupying Europe 175 and recently helped cause a
temporary collapse of negotiations in the Uruguay Round. All of these
issues remain unsettled.
176
Typical investment restrictions have included stipulations on owner-
ship, location, and introduction of technology. 177 International invest-
ment has long seemed an intractable area in which investment rules have
been weak, nonexistent, or unenforceable. 178 For example, the United
States has argued that export performance requirements inflate world
market supplies and thus act as subsidies forbidden under GATT, while
local content requirements violate GATT by acting as tariffs or quotas.1
79
The United States has further argued that both restrictions violate Article
III of GATT, the national treatment provision requiring equality in
domestic law and prohibiting internal quantitative regulations for protec-
tive purposes.1 80 However, the United States has been unable to persuade
170. See Fisher & Steinhardt, 14 L & Policy Intl Bus at 640 (cited in note 28). For
example, one exception exists for the motion picture industry.
171. See generally id.
172. See Holmer & Bello, 23 Intl Law at 526 (cited in note 37) (discussing the scope of
presidential fast-track authority). See also Birenbaum, 10 U Pa J Intl Bus L at 658 (cited in note
18).
173. Fisher & Steinhardt, 14 L & Policy Intl Bus at 527 (cited in note 28).
174. Morris, 6 Brookings Review at 20 (cited in note 86).
175. Id at 20.
176. NY Times A14 (April 4, 1991).
177. See Fisher & Steinhardt, 14 L & Policy Intl Bus at 593-94 (cited in note 28).
178. Id at 594, 665-687 (describing cases and bills involving Section 301 in connection with
investment issues and the use of Section 301 to eliminate foreign restrictions on U.S. investment).
179. Id at 675.
180. Id at 675-78. See generally John H. Jackson, National Treatment Obligations and
Nontariff Barriers, 10 Mich J Intl L 207 (1989).
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GATT to apply greater enforcement in these areas.18 1 Moreover, while
the OECD and other accords sometimes bring order to investment, they
have not traditionally helped U.S. companies facing foreign restraints. 
1 82
Furthermore, in "service" areas, the U.S. has so far been unable to
expand the scope of GATT. Less developed countries, for example, have
been reluctant to divert attention from trade barriers still affecting goods,
and Europe has even considered unilateral retaliation over service issues.
In addition to being ignored under GATT, service issues receive little cov-
erage under most U.S. trade agreements, MTN codes, or Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation treaties.18 3 Loose treaties address service
issues arising in shipping and insurance, but no established system exists
for addressing claims.
18 4
In the absence of international law or cooperation in the areas of
service, investment, intellectual property, and agriculture, unilateral retal-
iation becomes a tempting option for U.S. policymakers. Section 301
explicitly covers intellectual property,18 5 and since 1979 Congress has
evinced a clear intent to extend Section 301 into service areas as well.
186
Section 301 actions in these areas would be outside the scope of GATT
but could nevertheless provoke foreign retaliation.
Given that the scope of Section 301 extends beyond GATT, the ques-
tion is whether Section 301 can ultimately help the U.S. address short-
comings in the world trade order. At a minimum, Section 301 has
probably acted as a safety valve for venting congressional frustration:
Passing stern measures but giving final say to moderate presidents has
prevented the U.S. from pursuing more drastic unilateral solutions.
1 87
Two final observations deserve mention. First, using Section 301
does not necessarily require taking actual retaliatory steps. Potential
retaliation may be an effective prod. "More than any other U.S. trade
law, Section 301 works through feints and threats, rather than through
formal legal processes." 18 8 Similarly, "the most effective action that can
181. Fisher & Steinhardt, 14 L & Policy Intl Bus at 677-78.
182. See generally id at 678-85.
183. Id at 640. "The OECD Code on Invisible Transactions comes the closest of any
formal agreement to providing rules governing services; however, the Code has no enforcement
mechanism and is only hortatory in scope."
184. Id; see generally 653-62.
185. 19 USC § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(II).
186. Fisher & Steinhardt, 14 L & Policy Intl Bus at 589 (cited in note 28).
187. Id at 589. A president inclined toward protectionism, however, could well shift this
delicate balance.
188. Id at 578.
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be taken by a foreign country fearing the 'sting' of Section 301 would be
(1) to ensure that its market is truly open to imports, and (2) to join the
United States and other trading partners in pushing for meaningful pro-
gress in [GATT]." ' 9
Second, Section 301 is most effective when combined with clear and
reasonable demands.' 9° Articulating the right demands, never a simple
task, has become increasingly complicated as U.S. negotiators turn their
attention from comparatively well-resolved, straightforward tariff
problems to unfamiliar and politically sensitive areas. At this stage, effec-
tive communication is essential. Section 301 can help by prodding U.S.
trading partners into recognizing trade problems more quickly than they
would under the cumbersome machinery of GATT. 19 ' Section 301, when
used properly, can thus lead to better rules for global trade.
t9 2
All evidence indicates that Section 301 has made significant recent
progress toward achieving these ends. As Holmer & Bello state:
The United States has been criticized for its aggressive use of
Section 301. Yet on net, the results of this program in the last
three years have been substantially more open, freer trade,
widely benefitting producers and exporters in third countries as
well as in the United States. 193
Holmer & Bello might have added that Section 301 has achieved these
ends while staying within the confines of GATT. Perhaps Section 301 has
succeeded largely by being less aggressive than appearances suggest.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the OTCA does not fundamentally alter the relation-
ship between Section 301 and the GATT accords. When trade issues
arise, executive options remain the same: escape clauses, GATT nullifica-
189. Holmer & Bello, 510 Prac L Inst at 193 (cited in note 54).
190. See Fisher & Steinhardt, 14 L & Policy Intl Bus at 690 (cited in note 28). See also
Selective Safeguard Measures at 241 (cited in note 38):
[P]rivate complaints [under Section 301] can be most effective if they are directed at
relatively clear-cut violations of GATT commitments. These cases lend themselves for
straightforward disposition in accordance with preconceived procedures. On the other
hand, Section 301 and the new EEC instrument appear less effective in dealing with
'grey area' trade restrictions (VRAs, surveillance systems, price undertakings or export
forecasts, but also industry-to-industry arrangements) where the role of governments is
not always clear.
191. See Selective Safeguard Measures at 169 (cited in note 38).
192. Id at 241.
193. Holmer & Bello, 23 Intl Law at 527 (cited in note 37).
[Intramural Issue
Winter 1992] SECTION 301 & U.S. TRADE LAW 133
tion and impairment, and unilateral retaliation under Section 301. The
OTCA increases potential executive ability to violate GATT under Sec-
tion 301, but the OTCA does not compel such violations. Meanwhile, the
executive branch has carefully kept Section 301 within the boundaries of
nondiscrimination and multilateralism. In short, the OTCA additions to
Section 301 have raised a political stir but not a GATT violation. Ten-
sions in trade are acute, giving Section 301 the potential to backfire with
undesirable results. Nevertheless, the statute is gradually achieving its
ends-and reducing the need for its own existence-by prying open
export markets and securing a multilateral mandate to expand and
strengthen international trade law.

